Closed in practice — Iran declared a restricted zone, transits near ten a day

Crisis began Feb 28, 2026. The first week of September brought a change in method rather than intensity. On Sep 2 tankers were struck for the first time in this phase of the conflict. On Sep 5 Iranian forces fired ballistic missiles at US naval vessels, which were evaded, and three Iranian tankers were disabled or sunk. On Sep 6 Iran declared a restricted maritime zone covering the strait and the approaches to the Persian Gulf, and published a list of vessels it threatens to designate. That is the significant development: the coercion has moved from striking hulls to attacking insurance and future port access, which is cheaper to sustain and harder to insure against. Sep 7 passed without strikes from either side, which is a lull and not a ceasefire. Independent tracking puts the ten-day average at about ten commodity vessels a day against a pre-crisis baseline near 138, the lowest since May, so transits are still falling rather than recovering. Official statements are far apart, with Iran describing the strait as completely closed and Washington describing flows at two thirds of normal; the vessel count sits much closer to the Iranian claim. War-risk cover is reported at multiples of pre-crisis rates and hull war-risk premiums in the high single digits to ten per cent of hull value. Treat transit as commercially unavailable rather than physically impossible.

Houthi blockade — declared area now extends into the northern Red Sea

Houthi forces declared a maritime blockade on Saudi ports on Jul 20, 2026 and have sustained attacks since. Through August the declared area of concern was extended beyond Bab el-Mandeb into the northern Red Sea, with messaging focused on Saudi-linked tonnage — which removes the assumption that the northern approach to Suez is outside the threat area. AIS-traceable transits fell to about 200 vessels in the week to Aug 9, the lowest weekly figure in a year; part of that decline reflects vessels going dark rather than staying away, so treat it as a floor on the real fall rather than a measure of it. No new vessel was reported struck between Aug 27 and Sep 2. This corridor had been carrying Saudi crude around the Hormuz closure via Yanbu, so the disruption removes the principal workaround at the moment the strait itself is closing. US MARAD advisory 2026-006 remains in force to 22 September. EU naval mission advises vessels linked to Israeli, US or Saudi interests to avoid the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. BMP5 measures and UKMTO reporting required.

Piracy and conflict spillover — hijacking on Aug 20

A product tanker was hijacked in the Gulf of Aden on Aug 20, 2026 and redirected toward the Somali coast, the clearest sign yet that the piracy resurgence and the Houthi campaign are now overlapping in the same water. Somali hijackings have continued since late 2025. EU naval mission advisories cover the Gulf of Aden alongside the Red Sea. Naval escort recommended. UKMTO and MSCHOA reporting required.

Armed robbery & kidnapping risk

Highest kidnapping-for-ransom rate globally. Nigerian waters most affected. Armed attacks up to 300nm offshore. BMP WA guidelines apply.

Piracy resurgence — mother ship operations

Somali pirates operating 1000+ nm from shore using mother ships. A tanker hijacked in the Gulf of Aden on Aug 20, 2026 was redirected toward the Somali coast, indicating active receiving capability ashore. Fishing vessels and slow-moving merchant ships at highest risk. BMP5 measures required.

Petty theft & armed robbery at anchor

Incidents nearly doubled in 2025. Mostly opportunistic theft at night. Indonesian Marine Police patrols active. Strict watch required.

Robbery incidents — night watches essential

Petty theft and armed robbery. Mostly at night targeting vessels at anchor or slow speed. Coordinated patrols by MY/SG/ID navies.